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LEGISLATION
MODIFICATION AND DISCHARGE OF CONTRACTS-NEW STATUTES IN NEW
YoRK.-Two recent statutes have been enacted in New York which promise
to have an appreciable effect on the law of contracts: the first dealing with
the modification, change, and discharge of contracts without new consideration:1
the second dealing with the discharge of contracts and other obligations by
the accord and satisfaction.2 In recent years, the legislature of New York
has been encroaching upon the law of consideration to the extent of indorsing
the juridical philosophy of Lord Mansfield.3 Indeed, were it not for guber-
natorial veto, New York would have eradicated the idea of consideration in
written agreements.4 Consonant with the trend away from the requirement
of consideration, 5 the first of the aforementioned statutes aims to give binding
1. N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW (1936) § 33 (2); N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW (1936) § 280.
This is an amendment suggested by New York Law Revision Commission. See Leg. Doc.
(1936) No. 65 (D).
2. N. Y. PzRs. PROP. LAW (1937) § 33-a; N. Y. REA PROP. LAW (1937) §§ 280, 281,
These amendments were recommended by the New York Law Revision Commission.
See Leg. Doc. (1937) No. 65 (K).
3. Pillans v. Van Mierop, 3 Burr. 1663, 97 Eng. Reprints 1035 (1765). Lord Mansfield's
conception of contractual liability was interwoven with the law merchant. He conceived
the non-existence of a nudum pacturn in the law of merchants. Combining this with the
principle that "the law of merchants and the law of the land is the same" he concluded
that nudum pactum could not exist at common law. This was entirely inconsistent with
the doctrine of consideration. This led him to suggest that consideration was only of
evidentiary value and not needed for agreements in writing. In agreement with this theory
are: MARKBY, ELrarmus OF LAW (1896) 316; Holdsworth, Modern History of the Doctrine
of Consideration (1922) 2 B. U. L. REv. 87; SELEcrED REAiNGs ON TirE LAW OF CONTRAcTs
(1930) 99, 100. Lord Mansfield's theory was soon overruled by Rann v. Hughes, 7 T. R.
350 n. a, 101 Eng. Reprints 1014 (1778). See note 4, infra.
4. The New York Legislature passed a bill amending N. Y. PaRs. PROP. LAW (1936)
§ 33 (2) so that consideration would not be required in any written agreement to create
any contract, obligation, or lease, or any mortgage or other security interest in personal
or real property. 97 N. Y. L. J. No. 118, May 21, 1937. This bill was not approved
by Governor Lehman. Cf. N. Y. PERs. PRop. LAW (1936) § 33 (2), infra page 449, with
the above bill.
5. Lord Wright, Ought the Doctrine of Consideration to Be Abolished from the Common
Law? (1936) 49 IIARv. L. REV. 1225; Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration in the Law of
Contracts (1919) 28 YALE L. J. 621; POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE P ,oSOPrHY or LAW
(1922) 271 et seq.; Holdsworth, The Modern History of the Doctrine of Consideration
(1922) 2 B. U. L. REV. 87, 174; Ashley, The Doctrine of Consideration (1913) 26 HALv.
L. REv. 429.
A contrary opinion can be found in Ballantine, Is the Doctrine of Consideration Senseless
and Illogical? (1913) 11 MicE. L. Rav. 423. For a general statement by an eminent
jurist as to the effect the doctrine often has, see Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co., Ltd., v.
Selfridge & Co., Ltd., [1915J A. C. 847, 855, where Lord Dunedin said, "I confess that
this case is to my mind apt to nip any budding affection one might have for the doctrine
of consideration. For the effect of that doctrine in the present case is to make it possible
for a person to snap his fingers at a bargain deliberately made, a bargain not in Itself un-
fair, and which a person seeking to enforce has a legitimate interest to protect."
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force to certain agreements modifying pre-existing contracts. It is as follows:
"CAn agreement hereafter made to change, modify, or to discharge in whole
or in part, any contract, obligation, or lease, or any mortgage or other security
interest in real or personal property, shall not be invalid because of the absence
of consideration, provided that the agreement changing, modifying, or dis-
charging such contract, obligation, or lease, or any mortgage or other security
interest shall be in writing and signed by the party against whom it is sought
to enforce the change, modification, or discharge."0
To understand the purpose and effect of the statute a review of the common
law of New York is imperative. It has been established that a promise to
perform or the performance of a previously existing legal obligation is not a
valid consideration.7 A familiar situation exemplifying this rule of common
law exists where A Co. contracts with X Co. for the construction of a railroad
by X Co.8 X Co., upon discovering that certain subsoil conditions, which the
parties had not foreseen, will make the construction of the railroad extremely
difficult or will greatly increase the cost of construction, refuses to carry on
with the task unless A Co. promises to pay an additional compensation. A Co.
promises to pay the additional compensation if X Co. will perform the terms
of the original contract. At common law,9 in New York,10 A Co. would not
6. See note 1, supra.
7. The second agreement is declared invalid bemuse it is no legal detriment to the
promisee since, at the time this agreement was entered into, the promisee was already
legally bound to perform; likewise, performince under the second agreement is not a legal
benefit to the promisor because he was already entitled to performance under the first
contract. Bartlett v. Wyman, 14 Johns. 260 (N. Y. 1817); Vanderbilt v. Schreyer, 91
N. Y. 392 (1883); Weed v. Spears, 193 N. Y. 289, 86 N. E. 10 (1903); McGovern v.
City of N. Y., 234 N. Y. 377, 138 N. E. 26 (1923).
In New York, the law is the same where a third party is the promisee. Arend v. Smith,
151 N. Y. 502, 45 N. E. 872 (1897). This rule may have been modified to some extent
by DeCicco v. Schweizer, 221 N. Y. 431, 117 N. E. 807 (1917). In England and Eome
American jurisdictions the rule is otherwise as to third parties; that is, the promise con-
tained in the second agreement is enforced, thus determining that benefit to the promis-or
is equally as effective as detriment to the promisee. Abbot v. Doane, 163 Man. 433, 40
N. E. 197 (1895); Scotson v. Pegg, 6 H. & N. 295, 158 Eng. Reprints 121 (Ex. 1861).
Ames, Two Theories of Con.qderation (1899) 12 HARV. L. RaV. 515. The adverse holding in
New York, therefore, shows that only detriment to the promisee is consideration, except
as limited by DiCicco v. Schweizer, supra, where the promise ran to two people. Thus
in England, Massachusetts and other jurisdictions holding the same, if A has refused or
hesitated to perform an agreement with B, and is requested so to do by C, who will
derive a legal benefit from such performance and who promises to pay him a certain
sum therefor, and A, thereupon undertakes to do it, the performance by A of his agree-
ment in consequence of such request and promise by C is a good consideration to support
C's promise. But in New York, benefit, alone, to C is not sufficient consideration. A must
at least suffer some technical detriment by assuming an additional task or giving up some
privilege.
8. A similar fact situation may be found in King v. Duluth, M. & N. Ry., 61 Minn.
482, 63 N. W. 1105 (1895). For the purposes of this discussion, the facts will be varied.
9. In some jurisdictions the promise to pay additional compensation may be enforced
under certain circumstances, e.g., where an unforeseen and unanticipated difficulty increases
193'1
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be bound to pay the extra amount because X Co. was already under the legal
duty to perform in accordance with the original agreement. Stated in legal
terminology, X Co. furnished no consideration for the promise of A Co. Thus,
at a common law, in order to change, modify, or to discharge a contract by
subsequent agreement, the latter required for its validity a supporting con-
sideration." Although this rule is correct under the accepted theory of con-
sideration,12 it defeats the intention of the parties and hardship results when
all cases of change, modification, and discharge of an existing contract are
placed within this scope.
This rule invalidating any modification or discharge without any new con-
sideration, has always been the object of animadversion. It aroused antagonism
because human sympathy ordinarily extends to a debtor in dire straits; yet,
the law upheld the contention of the creditor who had breached his promise
in spite of the fact that all canons of social and commercial honesty viewed
the breach as unfair.'3 Theoretically, the promise to discharge or the dis-
charge of the entire debt in satisfaction of a lesser sum can be defended on the
theory that it is akin to a completed gift.' 4 Pragmatically, the rule was com-
the cost of construction. It may be pointed out in this connection that the distinction
upon which this exception to the general rule rests was found in the equities arising
from the circumstances of the particular case, rather than in strict legal principle. Though
the facts in King v. Duluth, M. & N. Ry., 61 Minn. 482, 63 N. W. 1105 (1895) did not
bring it within the exception which was there expressed, that case is generally thought of
as the source of the exception. Lenz v. Schuck, 106 Md. 220, 67 Atl. 286 (1907).
10. There is some authority in New York that a promise of extra compensation made
to a contractor who has encountered unforeseen difficulties may be enforced. Meech v.
Buffalo, 29 N. Y. 198 (1864). In that case, however, the question before the court con-
cerned the legality of an assessment made by the municipality to pay for the increased
compensation in consequence of the enhanced cost of work. The case of McGovern
v. City of New York, 234 N. Y. 377, 138 N. E. 26 (1923), although distinguishable,
seems to indicate that New York would not have followed this exception. These cases
are important today, in spite of the statute, when dealing with parol contracts of
modification.
11. See note 7, supra.
12. See note 7, supra. The most common test which is applied to determine whether
there is consideration for a promise is to find either a detriment to the promisee, which
seems to be the New York rule as pointed out in note 7, supra, or benefit to the promisor.
Ames, Two Theories of Consideration (1899) 12 HARv. L. Rnv. 515; Morgan, Benefit to
the Promisor as Consideration for a Second Promise for the Same Act (1917) 1 MnwN.
L. RFv. 383, 384. Wiliston, Successive Promises of the Same Performance (1894) 8 HAgv.
L. REv. 27.
13. 2 STRET, FouNDATioNs OF LxoAL Li iEnn (1906) 103.
14. Where there is an executed modification, the courts ordinarily hold that the trans-
action is binding and that it cannot be reopened. See Nicoll v. Burke, 78 N. Y. 580,
585 (1879); Hiltop Sand Corp. v. Simpson, 225 App. Div. 467, 471, 233 N. Y. Supp.
348, 352 (2d Dep't 1929). It would seem to follow that, where the debtor pays a lesser
sum in discharge of the greater, the creditor could not sue for that which the debtor
had thought discharged. But the law did not recognize the release of part as a gift, thereby
entitling the creditor to sue for the balance. To adhere to such a rule of law Is absurd
inasmuch as circumvention is easily attainable by the creditor taking the whole debt and
[Vol. 6
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pletely out of harmony with the practices of business.15 Historically, the
rule as rationalized in terms of consideration was originally a misconception30
And oddly enough, constant recognition of the rule by the courts violated
their own policy which was to encourage, wherever possible, extra-judicial
settlements.17
It is interesting to note that a diversity of situations take root in the broad
rule that the performance of the promise to perform that which one is legally
bound to do is insufficient consideration for a promise. In some cases there
is justification for its application. That is, surrounding circumstances militate
against the enforcement of the subsequent promise primarily on grounds of
public policy,' 8 although the reason has been repeatedly expressed in terms
then returning part. No difficulty whatsoever could arise here. To be theoretically con-
sistent, however, release of part could not be held a gift because the requirements of a
valid gift would not be present, tiz., actual delivery by the donor to the donee with intent
to make a gift. Cf. Gray v. Barton, 55 N. Y. 68 (1873), where the creditor made a valid
gift of a debt due him. The creditor with intent to make a gift thereof received from
the debtor one dollar, which was credited, and then the account was balanced by this
entry: "Gift to balance account." The creditor was not allowed to recover the balance.
15. Lord Blackburn, on the verge of dissenting in Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 605,
622 (18s4) remarked, "What principally weighs with me . . . is my conviction that al1
men of business, whether merchants or tradesmen, do every day recognize and act on the
ground that prompt payment of a part of their demand may be more beneficial to them
than it would be to insist on their rights and enforce payment of the whole. Even where
the debtor is perfectly solvent, and sure to pay at last, this often is so. Where the credit
of the debtof is doubtful it must be more so?' See A.soN, Co'.xm- crs (Corbin's Amer.
ed. 1930) § 140.
16. Ames, Two Theories of Consideration (1899) 12 HARV. L. REv. 515. In this article
Professor Ames traces the history of the rule that performance of a pre-existing duty is not
consideration and he points out that it has not even continuity with the past to support
it. See also AnsoN, CommAcrs (Corbin's Amer. ed. 1930) § 140.
17. That this policy of the courts has been followed is hardly disputable. An out-
standing example of this policy is found in the law of evidence where an admikon made
during an attempted compromise is held inadmissible if the court finds that it would not
have been made except for the purposes of negotiation. The rule has in view to encourage
and facilitate the settlement of legal controversies. See White v. The Old Dominion Steam-
ship Co., 102 N. Y. 661, 662, 6 N. E. 289, 291 (1886).
18. Three cases, which are regarded as the foundation of the rule that a promie
to perform a pre-existing legal duty is no consideration, are an illustration of the clo-e
relationship between accepted theories of consideration and public policy. These cams
seem to indicate that specific rules of consideration arose out of the current public policy
of the day. The first case, Harris v. Watson, Peake 102, 170 Eng. Reprints 94 (N. P. 1791),
decided solely on grounds of public policy, held that such agreements were unenforceable.
In that case, Lord Kenyon said (at 103): "If this action was to be supported, it would
materially affect the navigation of this kingdom. ... This rule was founded on a princile
of policy, for if sailors were in all events to have their wages, and in time of danger en-
titled to insist on an extra charge on such a promise as this, they would in many cases
suffer a ship to sink, unless the captain would pay any extravagant demand they might
think proper to make." Lord Ellenborough, in Stilk v. Ayrick, 2 Camp. 317, 170 Eng.
Reprints 1168 (N. P. 1809) doubted the wisdom of the reasoning in Harris v. Watson,
supra, and held, upon a similar set of facts, that the agreement was invalid because it
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of consideration. The cases which have been regarded as the foundation of
the rule that a pre-existing legal duty is not sufficient consideration, involved
promises of extra compensation to seamen bound by their articles to perform
all duties incident to the voyage.19 The fact situation in this type case
presented a situation where enforcement of such a promise ran counter to a
strong current of public policy expressed in the strict naval discipline of
the time.
That public policy is at the basis of rule is made clear by another class
of cases that fall within its scope. These are the cases of a promise to a
person already under a legal duty to perform an act, other than that arising
out of contract. Typical examples of this are a promise to pay a witness
already under subpoena2" and a promise to pay a public officer whose fees
are fixed by law.21 Great mischief would result if the law enforced the
promise inasmuch as it would encourage evil practices in public affairs. It
appears doubtful, however, that the statute will effect any change as to these
public duty cases. 2
2
Under the common law the rule that the performance of a pre-existing
legal duty is not consideration could be avoided upon the flimsiest of pretexts.
All that need be done by the party to whose advantage the new agreement
redounds is to take care that he incurs some technical detriment and the
promise will be enforced.23  For example, in the aforementioned assumed case
lacked consideration. In Bartlett v. Wyman, 14 Johns. 260 (N. Y. 1817) the court held
such an agreement unenforceable in that it was contrary to public policy and added (at
262): "The promise to give higher wages is void for want of consideration. The seamen
had no right to abandon the ship at Beaufort, and the promise to pay them an extra
price for abstaining from doing an illegal act was nudum pactum."
19. See note 18, supra.
20. Willis v. Peckham, 1 Brod. & B. 515, 129 Eng. Reprints 821 (C. P. 1820).
21. Hatch v. Mann, 15 Wend. 45 (N. Y. 1835); Carpenter v. Taylor, 164 N. Y. 171,
58 N. E. 53 (1900).
22. See note 1, supra. This statute under discussion could be stretched to Include
these public duty cases if the word obligation is construed to include public duty. The
statute reads, "An agreement . ..to change or modify . . . any ...obligation .'. . shall
not be invalid because of the absence of consideration. . . ." On the other hand, the
more tenable argument would seem to exclude these cases. Notwithstanding such argu-
ment in construing "obligation" to include public duty cases, inasmuch as such agreements
would be against public policy, their enforcement is doubtful. Moreover, the word "obli-
gation" in the statute seems to have been inserted to cover tort claims. See note 29, infra.
23. The earliest statement of this rule is found in the classical expression that the
giving of a "horse, hawk, or robe" would be consideration. Pinnel's Case, 5 Co. Rep.
117a, 77 Eng. Reprints 237 (K. B. 1602). Payment of a lesser sum by a negotiable
check has been held consideration. Goddard v. O'Brien, 9 Q. B. D. 37 (1882); or at an
earlier date, see Brooks v. White, 2 Met. 283, 287 (Mass. 1841); Bowker v. Childs, 3
Allen 434 (Mass. 1862); Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 605 (1884); or the giving of a
chattel mortgage, Jaffrey v. Davis, 124 N. Y. 164, 26 N. E. 351 (1891). These are com-
mon examples of the technical detriments which the promisee could secure from the promisor
to make the second promise binding. That would be consideration because the obligor
was under no pre-existing duty to pay by a negotiable check, or at an earlier date, or
to give a chattel mortgage. The effect of this doctrine is well stated in Jaffray v. Davis,
[Vol. 6
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if X Co. were to assume additional tasks, such as lengthening the platform of
a station depot one inch or promising to complete the work one day earlier,
this sufferance of detriment on its part might constitute a consideration." Under
a liberal interpretation, certain modifying agreements containing this technical
detriment would be enforced. But often they fail of enforcement because they
are held not to comply strictly with the technicalities which the existing law
sets up.25 Enforcement of promises modifying existing obligations has been
successful in those cases where the courts have been able to find some new
obligation undertaken or some privilege relinquished, thereby satisfying the
highly impractical and technical doctrine of consideration.
What has the new statute actually accomplished? To clarify matters, let
us return to our hypothetical case.2 X Co. brings an action upon the promise
of A Co. to recover the additional compensation. At common law there could
be no recovery because X Co. furnished no consideration for the promise of
A Co. inasmuch as it suffered no legal detriment by performing that which it
was contractually bound to do. But under the statute X Co. can now recover
if the promise is in writing and signed by A Co. The contract between the
parties may be modified as to any of its terms, or may even be discharged
by a subsequent agreement in writing and signed by the party against whom
it is sought to be enforced2 7 Consideration, which X Co. would have formerly
had to supply to enforce the promise, is definitely unnecessary. No longer
do the parties have to undertake the process of rescinding the old contract.3
The wording of the statute suggests that it was intended to cover tort
124 N. Y. 164, 171, 26 N. E. 351, 353 (1891), as to be so absurd as to hold that "a bar
of gold worth $100 will discharge a debt of $500, while 400 gold dollars in current coin
will not."
24. See note 23, suipra.
25. Mayer v. Penfield, 150 App. Div. 66, 134 N. Y. Supp. 762 (Ist Dep't 1912) is an
example of a situation which creates unnecessary confusion in the law. In this case
negotiations had been fully completed when the plaintiff-debtor was voluntarily promised
an addition to his compensation provided that he dosed the matter several days earlier
than agreed upon. One of the judges dissenting, the court held that the plaintiff furnisched
no consideration for the promise; that he performed no services that entitled him to extra
compensation. This particular case exemplifies the uncertainty and the lack of uniformity
which predominated at common law.
26. See page 449, supra.
27. See note 1, supra.
28. Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, Inc., 231 N. Y. 196, 131 N. E. 887 (1921), rearg.
denied, 231 N. Y. 602, 132 N. E. 905 (1921). This decision announced what may be
termed the "recission" exception to the rule that a promise to perform or the performance
of a subsisting contractual duty is no consideration. In a situation where A is contractually
bound to perform work, a subsequent agreement between the parties to the contract to
change or modify it is not, standing alone, sufficient evidence of a rescission of the prior
contract. Weed v. Spears, 193 N. Y. 289, 86 N. E. 10 (1908); Cosgray v. New England
Piano Co., 10 App. Div. 351, 41 N. Y. Supp. 886 (2d Dep't 1896); cf. Galway & Co. v.
Prignano, 134 N. Y. Supp. 571 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1912). In order to find a recis-on
there must be some additional evidence, McGowan & Connelly Co, Inc. v. Kenny-Moran
Co., Inc., 207 App. Div. 617, 202 N. Y. Supp. 513 (1st Dep't 1924). Such findings are
usually jury questions.
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claims. It says, in pertinent part, "An agreement . . . to discharge in whole
or in part . . . any . . . obligation . . . shall not be invalid because of the
absence of consideration .... -29 If, however, the word "obligation" is held
not to cover tort claims, that would not narrow to any great degree the effect
of the statute. The reason for this is that almost every claim that sounds in
tort is disputed either as to liability or as to the amount of damage. Since the
compromise of a claim as to which there is a bona fide dispute is supported by
a sufficient consideration, no serious problem,80 it seems, will arise.
Greatest support that can be given to the common law rule that a sub-
sisting contractual duty bars enforcement of a subsequent promise to per-
form -it, arises in the situation where a promisee who, without other reason
than the necessitous condition of the promisor, refuses to perform unless the
latter promises him more than he has agreed to take. In these "hold-up" cases
the common law rule, which denied enforcement of the subsequent promise,
achieved a desirable end. With the eradication of this rule in written
agreements, it might seem that the door will be opened to unscrupulous indi-
viduals to exercise coercive methods and to over-reach the other party. To
illustrate this particular point, let us assume that X Co. knows that A Co.
must have the railroad completed within a certain time and that to enter
into negotiations with another company would delay matters to such an extent
that a postponed construction of the railroad would result in severe losses
to A Co. With this knowledge, X Co. refuses to perform unless promised
an additional compensation. Under the strain of economic compulsion, A Co.
agrees to pay the additional sum if X Co. will carry on without delay. Under
the common law this agreement could not be enforced because there would be
no consideration for the promise. But under the statute, if the agreement is in
writing and signed by the A Co., the latter would be liable. It is highly ques-
tionable whether the existing law of duress would be a defense. However,
uncertain as the law governing duress may appear to be,81 there is a growing
body of cases that point the way to an adequate treatment of the "hold-up"
29. See note 1, supra. The meaning of the word "obligation" in a statute depends upon
the sense in which it is used. Good v. Farmer's Mutual Hail Ins. Ass'n 58 S. D. 106,
235 N. W. 114 (1931). There may be a contract obligation imposed by the operation
of law (see note 20, supra), or even an obligation arising out of a tort. In the light
of the circumstances which brought about the adoption of this statute, it would seem that
the intention of the legislature was to make it applicable to modifications of existing obli-
gations. An obligation arising out of or by operation of law is not capable of modification
by the parties. An obligation arising out of a contract is capable of modification by the
parties. Similarly an obligation arising from a tort is capable of modification.
30. Bandman v. Finn, 185 N. Y. 508, 78 N. E. 175 (1906); Byrne v. Padden, 248
N. Y. 243, 162 N. E. 20 (1928); Shuttinger v. Woodruff, 259 N. Y. 212, 181 N. E.
361 (1932).
31. The common law conception of duress, aided by the equitable treatment as to
what constitutes undue influence, has been greatly expanded by the modern law. The
modern tendency, in treating each case on its own special circumstances, Invariably seeks
the answer to the question, did the defendant have the freedom of exercising his own
will? What a particular court will deem duress is, therefore, open to uncertainty and
speculation. 5 Wi=soN, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1937) § 1603 el seq.
(Vol. 6
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cases.32 The trend of modem authority in America is strongly in favor of
recognizing economic compulsion as legal duress.as To insure the proper
safeguards, however, it might be wise to amend the present statute so as to
definitely provide for such situations as they arise. 4
By the legislation under discussion the parties to a contract can, if they
see fit, modify or discharge their obligations by mutual agreement in writing
without furnishing consideration. Similarly, one holding a claim ex contract,
or, possibly, ex delicto35 may release such claim in whole or in part.
The language of the above statute is broad enough to cover any case of
accord and satisfaction involving contracts and, perhaps, tort claimsP In
order to bring the law of accord and satisfaction into harmony with the
legislation liberalizing the law regarding the change, modification, and discharge
32. The strict common law concept of duress has been relaxed by the advent of the
"Doctrine of Business Compulsion." 5 Wm oasmoz, Co.--RAcrs (rev. ed. 1937) §§ 1617,
1613. Anciently, duress in law by putting in fear could exist only where there was such a
threat of danger as was deemed to sufficiently deprive a courageous or confident man
of his free well. I CLAnx, NEw YoRx LAw or CONTRACrS (1922) 122 et seq. The re-
sisting power, under this old view, was measured not by the individual affected, but
by the standard of a man of courage. This rule has been so expanded that durea3 may
be implied when a payment is made to prevent great property loss and there seems no
adequate remedy except to submit to an unjust demand. Minneapolis St. P. & S. Ste.
M. R.R. v. Railroad Commission, 183 Wis. 47, 197 N. Y. 352 (1924). See also Illinois
Merchants Trust Co. v. Harvey, 335 Ill. 284, 167 N. E. 69 (1929); Brown v. Worthington,
162 Mo. App. 508, 142 S. W. 1082 (1912); Van Dyke v. Wood, 60 App. Div. 20S, 70 N. Y.
Supp. 324 (1st Dep't 1901).
33. See note 32, supra. The doctrine of economic compulsion recognizes that to im-
peril a man's livelihood, his business, or financial condition is quite as coercive as to
detain his property. Precisely what test shall be applied is indeterminable. Therefore,
each case must be judged in the light of its particular circunstances. Jursdictions sup-
porting this doctrine are: Union P. R. Co. v. Public Service Commls&on, 248 U. S. 67
(1918); Illinois Merchants Trust Co. v. Harvey, 335 Ill. 284, 167 N. E. 69 (1929);
Rose v. Owen, 42 Ind. App. 137, 85 N. E. 129 (1903); Dana v. Kemble, 17 Pick. S4S
(Mass. 1836); Minneapolis St. P. & S. Ste. M. R.R. v. Railroad Commi on, 183 Wi3.
47, 197 N. W. 352 (1924).
34. In New York the law upon the doctrine of economic compulsion is somewhat
unsettled. The leading case in New York in support of the rule that a threatened breach
of contract is not duress is Doyle v. Trinity Church, 133 N. Y. 372, 31 N. E. 221 (1892).
Where a representative of the State of New York by the way of threats caused the plain-
tiff to make payments additional to those called for by the contract, the court held that
the uncertainty of the plaintiff's remedy made the threats duress. Homer v. State of
New York, 42 App. Div. 430, 59 N. Y. Supp. 96 (3d Dept 1899). There are several lower
court cases in New York holding that a refusal to carry out the contract is duress where
the legal remedy is inadequate or where none is available. Criterion Holding Co. v.
Cerussi, 140 Misc. 855, 250 N. Y. Supp. 735 (Sup. Ct. 1931); Independent Beltozerhower
Aid Society v. Suie, 187 N. Y. Supp. 59 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1921).
35. See note 29, supra.
36. "Any agreement . . . to discharge in whole or in part any contract . . . shall
not be invalid because of the absence of consideration... ." See note 1, supra. An accord
and satisfaction is one method whereby the parties may discharge a contract. This being
true, it follows that the statute covers accord and satisfaction cases. See note 29, supra.
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of contracts, the New York legislature recently enacted into law a new statute
relating to the effect of an agreement to accept a stipulated performance in
satisfaction of any obligation or claim at some future time. 7 Before a dis-
cussion of the statutory changes is taken up, it may be helpful to consider
the common law conception of "accord and satisfaction". It is essential to
clarity of reasoning to seek a meaning of firstly, an accord; secondly, a satis-
faction; thirdly, the effect of an executory accord.
An accord is a bilateral contract 3s whereby the promisee agrees to accept
in the future, in extinction or satisfaction of an obligation or existing con-
tractual duty, something different from or less than that to which he Is
entitled.3 9 An accord may be arrived at in any one of the following three
ways: first, in the form of an offer for a unilateral contract of accord; second,
in the form of a bilateral contract of accord, which is the true "executory
accord"; third, in the form of a bilateral contract of accord where satisfaction
is simultaneous with the promise. This can best be presented by reference to
our assumed set of facts. For the purposes of this phase of the discussion
assume that X Co. has completed the railroad and that A Co. owes it $100,000.
X Co. writes to A Co. that it will accept a deed to certain surrounding prop-
erty owned by A Co. in full satisfaction of the indebtedness. A Co., in ac-
cordance with the offer, tenders the deed to X Co. In this case the offer of
X Co. leads to a unilateral contract of accord. Acceptance of the deed is
satisfaction and discharge of the debt. In this case X Co. makes it clear
that only performance, not a promise, will be satisfaction; that is, it clearly
evidences an intention not to relinquish its right or cause of action on the
original claim until satisfaction has been received. At common law in New
York, A Co. could tender the deed in accordance with the terms of the offer
37. See note 2, supra.
38. The word "accord", to avoid confusion, should be used in one sense only, to wit,
where there are mutual promises to give and accept the proposed satisfaction. This is
the true "executory accord." N. Y. PEas. PRop. LAw (1937) § 33-a (1) defines the
executory accord as follows: "Executory accord as used in this section means an agree-
ment embodying a promise express or implied to accept at some future time a stipulated
performance in satisfaction or discharge in whole or in part of any present claim, cause
of action, contract, obligation, or lease, or any mortgage or other security interest In per-
sonal or real property, and a promise express or implied to render such performance In
satisfaction or discharge of such claim, cause of action, contract, obligation, lease, mort-
gage or security interest."
The contract of accord was recognized at a much earlier date than were simple contracts.
At early common law, acceptance of anything in satisfaction of damages caused by a tort
was a bar to the commencement of an action upon the original claim. Ames, Specialty
Contracts and Equitable Defenses (1895) 9 HARv. L. RaV. 49, 55. The enforcement of
such an agreement is much older than the first case enforcing a simple contract. Since
there was, at this time, no recognition of simple contracts, the accord was evidence of
the fact that satisfaction which was received was taken in discharge of the claim in
question. It made no difference whether the creditor asked for an act or a promise. All
that was important was actual performance of the accord.
39. Shepherd, The Executory Accord (1931) 26 ILL. L. Ray. 22; Wiliston, Accord
and Satisfaction (1904) 17 HAIv. L. REv. 459.
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and X Co. could refuse to accept the tender of performance by revoking its
offer prior to acceptance. 40 The withdrawal by the X Co. of its offer for a
unilateral contract of accord at any time prior to its acceptance might leave
A Co. in a very embarrassing and helpless condition. In order to prevent
the expectations of the parties from being defeated and to eliminate the con-
sequent injustice of the situation, the legislature passed the following statute:
"An offer in writing hereafter made, signed by the offeror, to accept a per-
formance therein designated in whole or in part of any claim, cause of action,
contract, obligation, or lease, or any mortgage or other security interest in
personal or real property, followed by tender of such performance by the
offeree before revocation of the offer, shall not be denied effect as a defense
or counterclaim by reason of the fact that such tender was not accepted by the
offeror."141
This new law allows A Co. to tender the deed without having to fear a rejec-
tion by X Co. In all cases which the statute covers, it prevents revocation of
the offer after performance has been tendered; it gives to a tender prior to
revocation the effect of an acceptance of the offer.
In connection with the use of the word "tender" an interesting question
of interpretation arises. An examination of the facts in the famous case of
Petterson v. Pattberg4 will throw some light upon the problem involved. In
that case the creditor offered to satisfy a mortgage upon the payment of $780,
on or before a certain date. Prior to the date set, the debtor knocked upon
the door of the creditor's house and said, "I have come to pay off the mort-
gage." 43  The creditor then stated that his offer was no longer open. The
court held that the creditor was legally justified in so doing inasmuch as he
revoked his offer before he accepted the money. If the words used by the
debtor amount to a tender," under the new statute the creditor could not
40. Kromer v. Heim, 75 N. Y. 574 (1879); Petterson v. Pattberg, 248 N. Y. 86, 161
N. E. 428 (1928). The latter case stands for the proposition that the offeror may revoke
his offer at any time prior to acceptance where his offer called for the performance
of an act rather than a promise. See note 47, infra. The Kromer Case, which involves
the question of accord and satisfaction, holds that an accord partly executed is ineffectual
to bar an action for the balance of the performance.
41. N. Y. PEs. PRop. LAw (1937) § 33-b; N. Y. REAL Pnop. L. w (1937) § 281. These
are recommendations of the New York Law Revision Commission. See Leg. Doc. (1937)
No. 65 (K).
42. 248 N. Y. 86, 161 N. E. 428 (1928); (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 199; (1928) 42
HARv. L. REv. 128; (1928) 14 CoRN. L. Q. 81; (1929) 27 Acir. L. REv. 465.
43. Petterson v. Pattberg, 248 N. Y. 86, 88, 161 N. E. 428, 429 (1928).
44. A tender has a definite legal significance. It imports, not merely the readiness and
ability to pay over the money or to deliver the deed or other property, at the time and
place mentioned in the contract, but also the actual production of the thing to be paid
or delivered and an offer of it to the person to whom the tender is made. Kreiss Potas-
sium Phosphate Co. v. Knight, 98 Fla. 1004, 124 So. 751 (1929). See Holmes v. Holmes,
12 Barb. 137, 144 (N. Y. 1851). An offer to pay what the offeror may conclude is the
proper amount does not, it has been held, constitute a tender. Seid Pak Sing v. Barker,
122 CaL App. 93, 10 P. (2d) 92, 95 (1932). From such authority, it may be inferred
that Mr. Petterson's words might not constitute a tender. See 1 Wxzsrox., Co!ramcrs
(rev. ed. 1936) § 167; AiqsoN, CoNTRAcTs (Corbin's Amer. ed. 1930) § 428.
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legally revoke his offer by refusing to accept the money. The reason for this
is that the statute makes tender of performance equivalent to acceptance.
Therefore, if it is determined that the debtor made a tender, the decision
of Petterson v. Pattberg4 5 is no longer law in New York because the statute 0
would be directly in point under such a set of facts. In that case it is im-
portant to note that the offer which the creditor made was for an unilateral
contract of accord not merely for an unilateral contract. Equally significant
is the fact that the statute under discussion does not, in any fashion, affect
the present law pertaining to the formation and effect of unilateral contracts
as distinguished from unilateral contracts of accord.47 In such a case as Petter-
son v. Pattberg the creditor can, under the statute, protect himself in one way,
viz., revoke his offer before the debtor makes a tender.
Assume now, that X Co. writes that if A Co. will promise to deliver the deed
to the desired property on or before a set date, X Co. will discharge the in-
debtedness it has against A. Co. A Co. promises to deliver the deed as re-
quested. In this case the reply by A Co. creates a bilateral contract of accord
or a true "executory accord." Examination of this type accord reveals a
good bilateral contract in which there is a good offer, a valid acceptance, and
consideration. 48 In spite of the fact that we have a perfectly valid contract,
it was not enforceable at common law because of the well settled rule that
an accord without satisfaction was ineffectual to bar a suit on the original cause
of action.49 No matter how unreasonable it may appear that an accord con-
taining mutual promises, and based on a sufficient consideration, should not
be given effect, the courts persisted in reiterating the statement that an accord
executory is of no binding force until executed or satisfied.8 0 Therefore, prior
45. See note 42, supra.
46. See note 41, supra.
47. N. Y. PERs. PRoP. LAw (1937) § 33-b was not designed to change the law of
unilateral contracts. Therefore, the law in New York, as to unilateral contract, seems
to be that the promisor may revoke his offer at any time prior to complete performance
by the promisee. Petterson v. Pattberg, 248 N. Y. 86, 161 N. E. 428 (1928). Some
doubt has been expressed, however, concerning that case insofar as it holds that the
offeror can revoke his offer at any time prior to complete performance by the offerce.
See 1 WLUSTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 167; Bacon, Book Review (1937) 5 FoRDHAM
L. REV. 526, 529.
48. The consideration for the accord is the mutual promises, by the debtor to perform
and by the creditor to accept. "Since a promise is an act, one who defines consideration
as any act or forbearance in exchange for a promise, will necessarily find a consideration
in every case of mutual promises." Ames, Two Theories of Consideraticn (1899) 12 H-Av.
L. REv. 515.
49. Peytoe's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 776, 77 Eng. Reprints 847 (K. B. 1603). The rule
in this case became common law rule in New York. Kromer v. Helm, 75 N. Y. 574 (1879).
50. This rule that an executory accord must be satisfied or executed to be binding was
understandable at a time when simple contracts were not recognized. But, when assumpslt
became well established, and mutual promises became consideration for each other, it
would seem that the courts should have given effect to the executory accord which was
a valid bilateral contract. See notes 38 and 48, supra. An excellent summary of the first
cases involving the effect of accords after the enforcement of simple promises was estab.
lished may be found in Shepherd, The Executory Accord (1931) 26 IhL. L. Rrv. 22, 29, 30.
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to the statute, A Co. could neither sue on the accord nor could A Co. set it up
as defense to an action brought upon the original claim. If, however, A Co.
under this factual set-up, delivered the deed as he had promised, the accord
would be satisfied and A Co. could base an action of its own to enforce it
or set it up as a defense to an action commenced upon the original claimu l It
would be a complete defense under a plea of accord and satisfaction.
A second part of the statute amplifies the rights of the parties. It reads:
"An executory accord, hereafter made, shall not be denied effect as a defense
or as the basis of an action or counterclaim by reason of the fact that the
satisfaction or discharge of the claim, cause of action, contract, obligation,
lease, mortgage or other security interest which is the subject of the accord was
to occur at a time after the making of the accord, provided the promise of the
party against whom it is sought to enforce the accord is in writing and signed
by such party."52
This section gives binding force to an agreement such as existed between
X Co. and A Co. Any time after the agreement is entered into, A Co. is no
longer placed in the uncertain position as to what X Co. may decide to do.
A Co. now has a perfect defense to any action that X Co. may bring on the
original claim. The statute does not make the executory accord a valid
contract and therefore enforceable; instead, it says that an executory accord,
which has always been a valid contract, is now enforceable either as a defense
to an action commenced upon the original claim or as the basis of an action
or as a counterclaim. The sole purpose of the section is to make executory
agreements of accord binding upon both parties except as limited by sub-
division 3 of the same section, which will now be quoted:
"If an executory accord is not performed according to its terms by one party,
the other party shall be entitled either to assert his rights under the claim,
cause of action, contract, obligation, lease, mortgage or other security interest
which is the subject of the accord, or to assert his rights under the accord. ' 3
The obvious purpose of this section is to entitle both parties to the same
redress in the event that the executory accord is not performed according to its
terms. Suppose that A Co. tendered the deed several days late or failed to
carry out the terms of its agreement in some other manner, X Co. would
not be bound to accept it nor would it be restricted to any action upon the
executory accord but could proceed to sue upon the original obligation.
The legislature wisely foresaw that if such an agreement were to be given
binding force, certain safeguards would be necessary. Clear and definite proof
of the agreement is therefore preserved by requiring the promise to be in
writing and signed by the party against whom it is sought to enforce the
accord. Preservation of the original claim is accomplished by providing that
The effect of the new statute is to give cognizance to the theory that an executory accord
is enforceable. See note 52, infra.
51. Prior to the new statute the party promising to perform bad to do so com-
pletely in order to defend an action brought upon the original claim. Kromer v. Heim,
75 N. Y. 574 (1379).
52. N. Y. Pzats. Paop. LAW (1937) § 33-a (2); N. Y. R.u, Peop. LAw (1937) § 280 (2).
53. N. Y. PEas. PROP. LAw (1937) § 33-a (3); N. Y. RrA Pnop. LaW (1937) § 280 (3).
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if the person against whom the claim is asserted fails to comply with the
terms of the subsequent agreement the claimant may assert his rights either
under the original claim or under the accord.54
The third type accord, viz, where the creditor treats the debtor's promise
as satisfaction, is not covered by the statute for the very good reason that
change in this respect is unnecessary. Thus, where X Co. writes to A Co. that
it will treat the indebtedness as presently discharged and satisfied if A Co. will
promise to deliver the deed to the property, the promise of A Co. to so deliver
immediately discharges and satisfies the original claim. The distinction between
this transaction and the transaction discussed above concerning the true execu-
tory accord is this: in this case the creditor immediately discharges the in-
debtedness upon receiving the promise of the debtor; that is, the creditor is
performing an act in return for a promise, just the converse of the situation
appearing in Petterson v. Pattberg-where the debtor performs the act in re-
turn for the promise. But where we have the executory accord, the creditor
does not discharge the debtor until the latter performs that which he has
promised to perform. When the debtor has performed his promise, he is
discharged. This, it must be remembered was the rule at common law. Under
the statute the two transactions are capable of having the same effect; in the
case of the executory accord, under the statute, it is a defense although execu-
tory. Likewise, where the creditor treats the promise as satisfaction, the debtor,
upon promising, has a defense to any action commenced upon the original
claim or cause of action.
If this third type can rightfully be called an accord, the debtor's promise
is satisfaction since that is precisely what the creditor asked for. One com-
mentator has described the transaction as a case of substituted agreement.55
It is analogous to a novation. The accord being simultaneously satisfied is a
defense to an action brought upon the original claim.
A most important case which occurs not infrequently and which is
greatly affected by the current changes is one like Foakes v. Beer." It involves
the situation where the creditor promises to forbear action upon the debt if
the debtor will pay a lesser sum than is presently due. At common law the
debtor would pay the lesser sum and if the creditor saw fit he could nevertheless
sue for the balance in spite of his promise not to do so. The reason advanced
was that payment of a lesser sum on the day in satisfaction of a greater sum,
cannot be any satisfaction of the whole. Here it is possible for the debtor
to promise to pay a lesser sum than is admittedly due, that is, to enter into
a contract of accord. Payment on the stipulated day would seem to be a
satisfaction since that act would be execution of the accord. It would seem
that we had a perfect case of accord and satisfaction. But the courts have
repeatedly held, in their blind adherence, to the decision of Foakes v. Beer,"7
54. See note 53, supra.
55. Corbin, Discharge of Contracts (1913) 22 YALE L. J. 513.
56. 9 App. Cas. 605, 36 Eng. Reprints 194 (1884).
57. See note 56, supra. The rule in Foakes v. Beer that the giving of a lesser sum
for a greater sum is not satisfaction has been described as ". . . evidently distasteful to
the courts. . . ." Smith v. Ballou, 1 R. I. 496, 498 (1851). See criticism in Jaffray v.
Davis, 124 N. Y. 164, 26 N. E. 351 (1891).
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that although the accord may be executed, payment of a lesser sum is not,
in law, satisfaction unless there is additional consideration, such as the giving
of a "horse, hawk, or robe"58 or as the modern law expresses it, the giving of
a "peppercorn" or "tomtit."5 9  Recognizing the absurdity of adhering to such
a doctrine the legislature passed the above quoted sec. 32(2) of the New York
Personal Property Law60 under which the creditor may discharge the debt
in whole or in part without having the debtor furnish consideration provided
that the agreement to discharge is in writing and signed by the party against
whom it is sought to enforce the promise. This convenient method of releasing
an obligation differs from sec. 33-a 6 ' and b(2 in that the latter section looks
forward to an agreement to accept a stipulated performance at a future date
whereas the former, sec. 33(2) ,63 has in view the present discharge or modifica-
tion of duties and obligations. The latter statute is not in any way changed or
modified by sections 33-a64 and b;o5 instead, the existing law relating to dis-
charge in praesenti is harmonized with discharge in futuro. Therefore, if the
factual set-up in a particular case involves a present discharge, sec. 33(2) ca
is applicable; if, on the other hand, an agreement to accept at a future date
a stipulated performance in discharge of an existing claim is involved, sec. 33-aF7
or b6s will apply.
58. Pinnel's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 117 a, 77 Eng. Reprints 237 (K. B. 1602).
59. In Couldery v. Bartrum, 19 Ch. D. 394, 399 (1881), Jessel, M.R., said, "According
to the English Common Law a creditor might accept anything in satisfaction of his debt
except a less amount of money. He might take a horse, or a canary, or a tomtit if he
chose, and that was accord and satisfaction; but, by a most extraordinary peculiarity of
the English Common Law, he could not take 16s, 6d in the pound; that was rudum
pactum . . . that was one of the mysteries of the English Common Law."
60. See page 449, supra.
61. See page 459, supra.
62. See page 457, supra.
63. See note 60, supra.
64. See note 61, supra.
65. See note 62, supra.
66. See note 60, supra.
67. See note 61, supra.
68. See note 62, supra.
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